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The paper is an overview of diversity in history, starting as far back as the societies in 
classical Ancient Europe and traditional non-European societies, where differentiation 
was basically between the enslaved and free population and the out-of-caste in India. 
With the end of slavery the European feudal society adopted a functionalist tripartition 
based on priests, warriors and peasants. 
The analysis continues in pre-industrial Europe (1500-1800), where in many cities class 
struggle was represented by the conflicts between crafts and between cities, with some 
participation of the élites. In 17
th century England only one class existed, and class 
struggle was the struggle inside one class. Other considerations on the stratification of 
pre-industrial society are related to classes inferred from empirical subjectivity, social 
hierarchy and horizontal and vertical solidarity. 
In industrial society, the paper discusses the Marxian, Weberian and Marshall models 
and the syncretism between status and class. 
The second part of the paper is devoted to diversity outside formal society with the 
definitions of the processes that generate the marginalization of people and social 
groups, while the third part of the paper concerns the urban milieu and social 
integration/differentiation. Considerations are made on urban topography (e.g. ghettos, 
“miracle courts”, etc.) and on the relationship between topographic position within the 
urban tissue and positioning in the social pyramid. 
Finally, the last part of the paper is an excursus on the historiographic assumptions and 
policies toward diversity and marginality. 
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Mapping Diversity in Social History 
by Ercole Sori 
 
1.  DIVERSITY WITHIN FORMAL SOCIETY 
1.1. Societies in classical Ancient Europe and traditional non-European societies 
The fundamental differentiation was between enslaved and free population and, inside 
the latter, between ruling classes (élites) and common people (plebs). Slavery did not 
come to an end at the end of the Ancient period, but with the conversion of Slav 
populations to Christianity the slave trade in Europe began to disappear [Ennen, 
1975:221]. This tripartition is similar to that applied by an historian-sociologist to the 
preindustrial European and extra-European city: upper class, lower class and out-of 
caste [Sjoberg, 1960]. A typical caste stratification was that of the traditional Indian 
society, being the possible evolution of a society divided into orders, when the purity of 
the blood was to be defended and became hereditary religious purity or impurity. In 
Vedic India it was the result of a race clash complicating the traditional tripartition 
(warrior and chief, poet and priest, plebeian) and adding a socially inferior fourth 
“colour” – the “blacks”, the “losers” – or the “untouchables”. In  18
th century India  200 
castes and 2000 sub-castes could be found within a specific hierarchy ; affiliation was 
by birth, endogamy was the rule and the subsequent specific lifestyle was to be adopted. 
No individual social mobility existed, apart from that of the entire sub-caste from which 
one could be excluded if unworthy, becoming in this way a social dreg. No products or 
labour market existed in the caste society. Caste-professions cooperated without 
usurping each other bordering functions; In conditions of overabundance one could 
change profession moving to a lower caste [Mousnier, 1971:17-21; Burke, 1980:86]. 
The same sort of order can be found in “marginal” layers in pre-industrial European 
society. 
 
1.2. The European feudal Society and its Subversion 
With the end of slavery, the European feudal society adopted a “functionalist” 
tripartition – priests, warriors and peasants- which, however, still resembled  a self-
representation of dominant social actors, that is to say a justification of the privilege   
not to work established by those who didn’t work [Burke, 1980:83]. A similar objection 
can be made to the social hierarchy theory by Mousnier, who assumed the distinctions 
made by his contemporaries, in 17
th century France, on the basis of juridical tractates 
regarding “orders” and “dignities”, which must be considered, from an historiographical 
point of view, socially self-referenced [Ibidem:88]. Starting from the 11
th-12
th century 
urban revolution a new actor, the bourgeoisie, was to be added to the two “active” social 
orders of the feudal word – clergy and aristocracy –, with a social structure which lasted 
until the end of the ancien régime [Pirenne, 1971:143]. Sjoberg [1980], on the contrary, 
considers the middle-age European urban bourgeoisie hegemony as a pause in the 
continuity of the power held by clergy and aristocracy until the French Revolution 
[Sjoberg, 1980:89]. According to Pirenne, who uses  the terms “order” and “class” 
interchangeably, the bourgeoisie was a “rootless class and at the same time a class of 
free-men who neither cultivated the land on which they settled nor owned it. It was a 
privileged, juridically separate order, isolating itself from the popular rural mass; it 
conceived liberty as a monopoly and had a caste-attitude which was first its strength  2
and, by the end of the Middle Ages, its weakness.  The subversive role of this 
bourgeoisie – as distinct from the rural masses - derived from economic growth, the 
spreading of the market and  money. Cities began to expand the market, attracting the 
countryside which was stimulated to augment rural production (agricultural 
colonization) whose profits went to peasants. A similar scenario was that of land 
properties and monasteries. A “free” peasant appeared (a non-serf) with a burgenses-
like juridical status. A money-based wealth appeared, along with money-valuable 
products (capital). Inflation appeared, with a redistribution of wealth in favor of 
merchants and craftsmen, at the expense of land owners, also thanks  to the loan and its 
consequent interest rate [Pirenne, 1971:143-149]. The rise of these new and 
economically active social actors was favoured by the fact that professional incomes 
were tax free [Fasoli, 1973:62]. 
These economic and political transformations had relevant consequences on a socio-
cultural level. At the end of the Middle Ages some lay spirit began to spread, in spite of 
the general continuity of religious feelings. The clergy privileges – wealth, fiscal 
immunity and an economic activity exploiting market benefits without bearing the 
relative burdens, began to arouse  tensions. Power conflicts (parish priests elections) and 
competence conflicts (hospitals management)  arose between civil and religious 
authorities (although without anti-clericalism) [Ennen, 1975:223]. Merchants and 
craftsmen founded schools  for their children, since business and productive work was 
opposed by the pedagogy of religious schools [Ibidem:226]. 
 
1.3. Pre-industrial European society in the modern age 
 
As for the origins of capitalism, an intense debate has been going on among social 
historians about the transformation of social stratification before industrialisation. 
1.3.1.  Proto-classes and popular backlashes. This is an attempt to apply the 
Marxian approach to late Middle Ages and modern European society. 
Disorders, strikes and controversies in 14
th and 15
th century European cities 
marked the end of the solidaristic and cooperative climate of the previous  
“horizontal” urban society. However in this case it would not be correct to 
speak of proletariat and class struggle because of the very nature of the 
struggle, or rather conflicts between crafts and between cities, with some 
participation of the élites [Ennen, 1975:216-218]. The so-called “Tumulto 
dei Ciompi” (textile workers) in  14th century Florence is one of the best 
known backlashes. According to Porshnev, who analyzed  the popular 
revolts in France between 1623 and 1648 in class terms, these were 
conscious acts of subversion by peasants against an unjust social order, 
during which peasants joined on a local basis to burn castles. Mousnier does 
not agree with this interpretation and considers those backlashes as  mere 
violence outbursts; on the contrary, peasants and aristocrats were united 
against central government tax collectors [Burke, 1980:88-90]. 
1.3.2.  Only one class. According to Laslett, if  the concept of “class” were one 
of “social status” and of various degrees of consideration implied in 
relationships, it would be wrong to speak of one class in the pre-industrial 
world; but, if by class we mean power and richness, class conflict, inner 
solidarity and so on, at least in 17th century England (the Stuart period)  3
only one class existed. A distinction must be made between “social group” 
(people with the same social status) and “class” (political management of  
economic power): in the society of that period, only one class was able to 
act in conformity with a common plan regarding the entire society; “class 
struggle” was the struggle inside one class, the only class according to the 
former definition. There was a clear distinction between those who 
“counted” (gentry, gentlemen) and those who “didn’t ”. But that was not a 
static society: social cimbing was possible for those who were at 
University,  the professionals, clergymen and those in the army [Burke, 
1980:88-90]. L. Stone is aware of this dynamism when he distinguishes 
English social structure into two separate ages. Aristocrats and gentry 
surpassed the other social groups in the 16
th century.In the 18
th century the 
status achieved by medical, juridical and ecclesiastical professions enabled  
their members to compete with the aristocrats [Burke, 1980:92]. 
1.3.3.  Empirical subjectivity. Some authors have tried  to stratify pre-industrial 
society using values and criteria on the basis of which contemporaries 
perceived social differences and  modelled their behaviors accordingly. For 
example, according to sociologists and social historians,  the principle of 
marriage between “diverse” can be seen (different religious belief, class, 
ethnic group and so on), as the best indicator of social integration. For what 
concerned  ancient-régime France, Daumard and Furet – observing the 
marriage market segmentation by socio-professional actors – identified 13 
social groups. According to Mousnier, instead, this criterion has an 
economic connotation, being based on socio-professional categories drawn 
from the contemporary economic and social structure [Burke, 1980:91]. 
1.3.4.  Social hierarchies. According to Mousnier, instead of speaking about 
social class or proto-class, it is possible to examine social stratification (for 
past times, above all) mixing five measuring scales: * legal stratification 
(not present in all societies; it availed itself of laws, jurisprudence and 
custom); * social status (the most important scale, measuring differences in 
consideration, dignity, rank, honour and prestige between diverse 
individuals and social groups like households, corps, colleges, 
communities); * economic hierarchy (based on the nature and dimension of 
available resources, often confused with social status); * power scale 
(measuring the possibility to influence the will and behaviour of others, 
including the influence on public opinion); * ideological stratification. The 
combination of these scales and measurements will create a stratification by 
orders. Orders tended to divide themselves into “states” and to be 
hereditary, characterizing different societies in space and time: India, at the 
beginning of the Vedic period; feudal France; China between 1368 and 
1912. The society by orders was based on consensus and characterized by 
“state” endogamy and heredity [Mousnier, 1971:7-15]. Richness, according 
to Mousnier, didn’t determine status: a poor aristocrat is socially more 
important than a rich merchant [Burke, 1980, 89-92]. 
1.3.5.  Horizontal and vertical solidarity. These types of solidarity were referred 
to class structure (horizontal) and hierarchical structure (vertical). As for 
pre-industrial society, Mousnier underlines that vertical solidarity mostly  4
shapes social relationships, e.g. between owners and tenants or patrons and 
“clientes” E.P.Thompson, an English scholar who studies  the rise of the 
working class, argues that 18
th century England was characterized by   
vertical solidarity (for what concerns plebs) and a still uncertain identity 
and consciousness of the rising working class [Burke, 1980:89, 92]. 
 
1.4.  Industrial society 
1.4.1.  The Marxian model. Class society made its appearance in market 
economy, of which it embodied the main values such as a role in the 
productive process, the social and political importance of the entrepreneur, 
earnings. It had no juridical discriminations but only de facto differences, 
though weakened by correctives (patrimonial heritage, endogamy) 
[Mousnier, 1971: 22,24]. Class, Marx argued, is a social group with 
specific functions in the productive process as owner of one of the classical 
“factors” (land, capital and labour). Classes had contrasting interests and 
different ways of thinking and acting. This is a schematic view: Marx 
himself varied between dichotomies (exploiters and exploited, oppressors 
and oppressed) and more analytical categories (Roman slaves and plebs, 
serfs and medieval labourers) or, again, referred to exceptions to the 
general framework (lack of consciousness and solidarity, as for mid- 19
th 
century French peasants). According to Burke, the class concept fits very 
well into the European 19
th century society, while other societies and ages 
should be defined by different concepts [Burke, 1980:84-86]. 
1.4.2.  The Weberian model. According to Weber, what differentiates classes is 
not the productive factor, but  the possibilities of their members to act on 
the market. Weber identifies four hierarchical “power” levels on the market  
[Mousnier, 1971:24-25]: a) owners of  goods to sell (they were not obliged 
to do so, because they could transfer such property from consumption to 
investment later exchanging the product in view of a profit and so 
becoming  entrepreneurs); b) rentiers; c) owners forced to sell their own 
products to survive; d) sellers of labour force. As for pre-industrial Europe, 
Weber used notions both of class and rank, conceived as a group whose 
destiny was determined by social status and the related honour granted 
legally or by birth,  with powers and privileges. In the short period, for 
example, huge consumptions could unify owners and non-owners, but in 
the long term property ended by discriminating between the two groups 
[Burke, 1980:86-87]. 
1.4.3.  T.H. Marshall. According to Marshall, social classes corresponded to the 
place occupied by individuals in the business hierarchy, from the director to 
the temporary staff. This model originated in an open-society like 
capitalism and big business U.S.A. This is a competitive society based on 
opportunities, in which class is measured by economic and professional 
success to which, in principle, everyone could aspire. Mousnier suggests 
that in this model liberal professions and intellectual work (technocracy) – 
whose relevance is  increasing more and more in contemporary industrial 
societies – are not represented [Mousnier, 1971:25]. 
  5
1.5. Synthesis and intermediate situations 
1.5.1.  Syncretism between status and class. While Marx was interested in 
power relationships and conflict,  Weber privileged values, ways of life and 
consensus. Class and rank corresponded in this way to these two different 
points of view and observations  about contemporary society. Burke states 
that class and rank categories should be integrated so as to provide a 
framework within which deep social differentiations can be better analysed 
[Burke, 1980:87, 93]. 
1.5.2.  Intermediate situations. According to Mousnier, distinctions between 
social stratification models and their evolutive trends aren’t always clear 
and univocal from an historical point of view. 15
th and 16
th century 
England, for example, experienced a slow transition from an order-based 
society to a class-based society. In the 20
th century United States some 
anthropologists have found a sort of involution generating stratified-by-
order pockets in a class-structured society. With the transition to   
monopolistic capitalism, the “new middle class” becomes stagnant in social 
mobility terms, particularly in a period of economic depression. New 
anxieties re-emerge both about status and anything representing a social a 
standing: good manners, good pronunciation, education, old school 
relations, “exclusive” clubs, etc. [Mousnier, 1971:28-32]. 
 
2.  DIVERSITY OUTSIDE FORMAL SOCIETY 
2.1. Tools of analysis 
2.1.1.  Definitions. The processes of marginalization of people and social groups 
take place at two levels, not necessarily overlapping: that of socio-cultural 
values and the level of socio-economic relationships. These processes 
generated almost four stable or provisional conditions [Schmitt, 1979:262; 
Berengo 1999:521]: a) unlawfulness ( the social deviation by excellence, of 
people breaking the law); b) marginality (involving those who deviate from 
the norms but still retain a formal status in society. It was a reversible, 
temporary condition (reintegration) generated by a process opposite to 
social integration. The term marginality can also refer to a sort of gray zone 
between acceptance/legality and exclusion/illegality); c) exclusion (an often 
ritualized fracture with the social body, leading to isolation and 
discrimination); d) minority (it includes those who are not recognized as  
permanent members of a community. A minority may not be weak or 
precarious, e.g. mercantile colonies). Borders between these conditions 
were not always well clear and single conditions could be variously 
combined. For the European Middle Ages, J. Le Goff adopts a  different 
criterion, distinguishing – within the marginalization process – four 
categories with uncertain boundaries: * those who were excluded or bound 
to be excluded (criminals, wanderers, foreigners, whores, suicides, 
heretics); * The disqualified (people who did defamatory jobs like butchers, 
dyers, soldiers of fortune, or sick, invalids, poor, women, children, old 
people, bastards); Marginals in the strict sense of the word (declassified 
like poor knights, madmen, beggars, usurers – these last very close to 
exclusion); Fictitious marginals (geographical marvels, monsters, savages).  6
Social history has recently explored with more precision  minority and 
deviant social and cultural areas using the following key concepts. 
2.1.2.  Border, that is to say the system of norms, values and behaviours respect 
to which one was considered “inside”, “marginal” or “outside”. Border and 
edge could also have  a spatial meaning referring to a  knowledge getting 
weaker and weaker while going far from a well known “centre”, a line 
beyond which an “elsewhere” lies. It could be a world crowded with 
monsters and prodigies, an oniric horizon where Europeans projected their 
ghosts and their repressed desires (sexual freedom, nakedness, a “reversed 
world” where horses rode men and which was used to persecute heretics 
and condemn deviants from the “centre” [Schmitt, 1979:263]. 
2.1.3.  Labellers and labelled. It is the identification of social groups able to 
define the norms (labellers) and of the ones subject to the norm itself 
(labelled). One well-known example was witchcraft, invented by 16
th-17th 
century Inquisitors to fight fortune-tellers and heretics. This concept can be 
applied to the so-called “able-bodied beggars” of Elizabethean England, 
too, seen as healthy, idle and lounger vagabonds and not as unemployed. 
Labelling, originating from a clash between social groups, institutionalized 
deviance also through the language, coining a disparaging lexicon to 
identify single deviants [Burke, 1980:77-78; Le Goff, 1979:24]. 
2.1.4.  Symbolic violence. This was a process leading subaltern groups to 
recognize the legitimacy of the dominant culture against their own culture 
perceived as illegitimate. One example was the Counter-Reformation attack 
against the popular religiosity of the peasants who were persuaded to 
consider their culture as idolatrous, superstitious and even satanic [Burke, 
1980:76-77]. 
2.1.5.  Transit rites. It is the codification of the transition from one condition 
(marginality) to another (exclusion), usually taking place in three stages: 
separation, junction and aggregation. A similar rite can be found in the ban, 
with which one person was deprived of citizenship. Also the reversal 
process (re-integration) is often ritualized. Sometimes the imposed 
punishment symbolized the exclusion from the world of the living: heretics 
were walled up, lepers were buried in the grave, after the ritual separatio 
[Schmitt, 1979:262, 271; Le Goff, 1979:25]. 
2.1.6.  Social control. It is the whole of the formal and informal practices which 
punished deviance and rewarded conformity to dominant social values. 
This concept becomes more complicated if society is made up of different 
social groups, each one with its own values and in conflict with the others. 
as happens in multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural societies 
[Burke, 1980:80]. In pre-industrial society – between the 18
th and the 19
th 
century, above all – formal mechanisms of social control multiplied and 
specialized as a consequence of demographic growth, population expulsion 
from the traditional economic structures, urbanization and rise of big cities  
The capital city, above all, was the symbol of the order reigning all over the 
State, the laboratory for new forms of social control exercised by the State 
in contrast with the Church and primary socialization structures [Sori, 
1982:13-17]. Informally, the society itself exerted social control, as in the  7
case of French charivari, a rite with which an old man marrying a young 
girl (or a husband being beaten by the wife) was derided by the whole 
urban quarter. This punishment allowed the man who had broken the social 
norm to be reintegrated in society. [Burke, 1980:81]. 
2.1.7. Integration and re-integration mechanisms. Many were the social 
structures delegated to such roles. First of all, of course, came the family, 
whose more or less traumatic breaking or abnormal functioning 
(detachment, dispersion, widowhood, orphanhood, illegitimate birth) often 
meant vagrancy, poverty, criminality; sometimes the detachment from the 
family was of a provisional nature, as in the case of “poor students”,   
clerics in search of benefits, job-looking compagnons. Other reintegration 
instruments were the craftsman shop, which often presupposed the boy’s 
cohabitation;  groups of youths (abbayes de jeunesse), aimed to limit 
juvenile violence and excesses; and also the charivari. Some institutions 
were also relevant to this point: some juridical institutes of pseudo-kinship; 
Franciscan or Dominican tertiary orders, better than unofficial beguinnage; 
parochial, quarter and job confraternities; university colleges [Schmitt, 
1979:278]. Heretics salvage and their reintegration into the Christian 
community took place  thorough expiation acts, with long-term 
imprisonment and the obligation to wear exterior distinctive signs. Hard 
labour was the solution proposed to the Hôpital Général, the Zuchthäuser, 
and the workhouses internees, as an instrument for the reeducation of the 
laggard poor and their reintegration in the productive world [Ibidem:272, 
276]. 
2.1.8.  Diversity within diversity. Also a diversification within diversity existed, 
as in the case of heretics distinguished between “ perfect” and “believers” 
(“perfetti” and “credenti”), and among thieves between pickpockets” and 
“receivers of stolen goods”. Such identity distinctions derive from social 
marginality subcultures, expressing themselves in different ways: 
distinctive signs (tattoos), tonsure for false clerics claiming juridical 
extraterritoriality, honour rules (oath, secrecy), tricks (loading the dice; 
passe par tout), jargon (picaroon, gangsters), undergraduates’ anarchism 
[Schmitt, 1979:279]. Jews were divided by “nation” (Italians, Levantines, 
Spaniards, Portuguese, etc.), adopting the same  distinction made by 
merchants’ foreign communities [Berengo, 1999:524]. 
2.1.9.  Ideological bases of social diversity. According to Le Goff, the 
ideological bases of marginalization processes were rooted in some typical 
medieval society obsessions : a) religion, which made heretics the 
marginals (or, more precisely, the excluded) par excellance; b) body 
diseases (as sin embodiments, they transformed automatically sick and 
invalids into poor, making the leper the living image of sin, condemning 
whores; c) identity (phobia against Jews and foreigners. If at the market a 
Jew touched some goods, particularly food, he was forced to buy them, ; d) 
subjects and acts against nature (monsters and sodomites); e) need for 
physical and social stability (leading to the condemnation of beggars, 
wanderers, socially unstable and degraded persons); f) work (its  8




2.2.1.  Civil unlawfulness. A criminal should be the clearest image of deviance: 
a community member breaking community norms. Hence the pedagogic 
value of public punishment , from the mildest ones (pillory, cage, flogging) 
to the extreme one (capital punishment) [Baronti, 2000]. Deviants were 
then  segregated from the social body. In 1297 Florence,  four separate 
jailhouses were financed, one for those who were condemned by law-
courts, another for private debtors, another for women and finally one for 
young people, male se gerentes. Specific buildings were built in the 15
th 
and 16
th centuries, but the  notion of jailhouse and criminal became more 
vague. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, in that period, custody houses for  
sons rebelling to their parents were opened. The same was true for 
turbulent university students. Inside the  Tower of London there was a 
special prison for night walkers, that is the people who were arrested for 
curfew violation, like whores, adulteresses, clerics and laymen charged 
with sexual crimes [Berengo, 1999, 626, 631]. Sometimes, deviants came 
from the upper levels of the social pyramid. Some social structures pushed 
certain people towards non-conformist behaviours. In the Mediterranean 
area, for example, brigandage was widespread and practised by many 
impoverished aristocrats who, were “forced” to plunder in order to preserve 
their honour. Their socialization pushed them to deviance [Burke, 1980:79-
80]. 
2.2.2.  Religious unlawfulness The 11
th-12th centuries saw the birth of new 
heresies  strongly appealing to common people (Patarines, Waldenses, 
Lyonese, Chatarists) whose influence lasted until the 15th century 
(Rhineland free spirit brotherhood, Bohemian Hussites). In the 13
th century 
the “Inquisition” Court started its work which sentenced to death (by stake) 
heretics to bring them back to the real faith. Protestant reform was a form 
of heresy, which, after becoming a Church, started to persecute its own 
heretics (Michele Serveto’s stake condemnation by Calvin). In the 16th 
century the heresy age declined and the phenomenon of sects took its place 
(Quakers, Mormons, marginals who followed religious life ideals in a 
secularizing world). Witch-hunting was particularly intense around the 
15
th-17th centuries, being the symptom of a divorce between urban and 
peasant culture. In the 17
th century social alarm shifted from witchcraft 
practices to satanic possession [Schmitt, 1979:271-272, 275]. 
2.2.3.  Social highwaymen. The social highwayman phenomenon is a form of 
pre-political rebellion characterizing the struggle between the rural feudal 
order and capitalism, with the creation of “village heroes” which 
employers’ power organizations strived to regain to their cause (see i.e. the 
myth of Robin Hood, but also contemporary industrial society phenomena 
such as Sicilian highwayman Giuliano) [Schmitt, 1979:281]. 
2.2.4.  Revolutionaries and rebels. As far as the pre-industrial era is concerned 
it is doubtful whether deviancy, marginality and exclusion had strength  9
enough to challenge the dominant social order. This seems to have been 
very unlikely in the case of heretics and sects which, although radically 
critical, didn’t succeed in prefiguring an alternative social order. Their 
criticism inherited a pulsion towards transgression, “life gone wild” and 
naturalism, which pervaded western world history. Being a rebel, for the 
morality of the time, meant being a criminal, but marginals weren’t leaders 
of the rebellion, at the most they could be participants. Ciompi and 
Sansculottes weren’t marginals, they belonged to the official society 
[Schmitt, 1979:280-281]. 
. 
2.3. Marginality. Did a “positive” marginality exist? Generally speaking, 
marginality (with some exceptions, like beggars, university students, gypsies) 
was within the urban community and helped by the community itself. The new 
social history focuses upon many marginal categories. 
2.3.1.  Lepers. The leper was “ Christ’s poor”, on whom both mercy and 
repulsion were bestowed. Sometimes leprosy was regarded as a crime and 
the leper was persecuted, for instance with the seizure of his goods, and 
civil interdiction. Leprosy declined in the 14
th century, and in particular 
after the 1348 plague, and between the 16
th and the  17
th centuries it 
disappeared progressively from Europe [Berengo, 1999, 621; Schmitt, 
1979:271] 
2.3.2.  Lunatics. Middle-Age lunatics, if not frantic, were better integrated in 
society, though maintaining a recognizable identity. As for the poor, 
towards this kind of marginality a radical value inversion took place: in 12
th 
and 13
th centuries madness was a kind of positive condition, associated 
with “Christ’s madness” or with the “holy minstrels of God”. In the 17th 
century the opposite attitude prevailed and madmen were segregated 
(renfermement). The18
th and 19
th century psychiatric hospital was bound to 
receive the old Hôpital Général heritage [Schmitt, 1979:227]. 
2.3.3.  Poor and beggars. “Voluntary poverty” permeated the early-medieval 
Christian practice well before the  mendicant orders’ appearance in the 13
th 
century. Governments had to face poverty as a social condition, posing 
administrative problems (tax exemption) and requesting care (assistance). It 
was therefore necessary for them to distinguish between structural poverty 
(as for Spain, “of solemnity”) and conjunctural poverty, caused by wars, 
famines, epidemics. Poverty particularly affected lonely women – usually 
widows.Conjunctural poverty generated the so-called “shameful poor” 
(“povero vergognoso”), an impoverished nobleman or a night-begging 
person who didn’t want to be recognized and had to be assisted in a discrete 
way concealing the mite destination. From  the middle of the 13
th century 
onwards, the assistance fell on some kind of rescue charitable institutions 
[Berengo, 1999:588-594]. The negative economic conjuncture of the late 
Middle Ages (14
th and 15
th centuries) increased social and economic 
polarization. The poor grew in number, and at the same time municipal 
measures against begging intensified: flogging, in English towns; fire-
branding in Augusta. Poor people’s associations were rising, too. In 
Strasbourg and Cologne blinds and beggars groups joined, with solemn  10
promise for mutual assistance and solidarity and town partition into zones 
within which they begged. In the late 16
th century Rome was divided 
among 19 beggars bands. City authorities themselves indicated begging 
zones: in front of some churches (Nuremberg), in a street reserved to 
beggars in Frankfurt [Ennen, 1975:219; Berengo, 1999:600-602]. 
Unlike“resident”poverty, accepted and protected, vagrancy-associated 
begging was firmly fought, as it was thought to be false poverty [Berengo, 
1999:596]. Wandering and poverty lost the divine character, both 
functional and structural, they had had in the late Middle Ages, as 
happened with pilgrimages or the training of  boys and compagnons 
participating in the tour de France. The spreading of pauperism and 
wandering phenomena in the late Middle Ages persuaded the ruling classes 
to make a distinction between “real poor” (sick, blind) and able-bodied 
beggars. After the 1348 plague, expulsion injunctions from towns for 
wanderers and able-bodied beggars increased (1351 edict, by John the 
Good, France; Statute of Laborers, England), but it was evident that the 
urban dimension of those measures was an economically incongruous 
strategy at the state level. More and more did the poor come to be regarded 
as potential thieves. For the 16th century ruling classes, “barbarians are 
inside the walls” but outside too, with gangs of beggars plundering 
travellers [Schmitt, 1979:273-274]. In many European cities, the 
identification scheme for the poor was simple: children, old people and 
invalids were given a badge and were authorized to beg; all the others 
(healthy men, always, and often women) had to work [Berengo, 1999:588-
594; 596-598]. 
2.3.4.  Wanderers. They provoked economic externalities, thus opposing 
themselves  to resident and native marginals always recognized by local 
communities as  their own and therefore protected. Wanderers were 
disliked by the local population, although they tried to disguise themselves 
as pilgrims. However, the definition of this category was always difficult, 
as they meddled with poor and beggars and were fined, imprisoned and 
expelled. Juridical debates arose about the opportunity that the wanderer 
should be qualified on the basis of the place of birth or the place of 
residence. In German 14
th and 15
th century towns, foreign wanderers could 
only stay for three days. Alongside with flogging (England) expulsion was 
a frequent practice at the city level, though not very effective. At the State 
level, as happened in 13
th century Spain, it didn’t make sense and was 
replaced with the refusal of assistance to able-bodied beggars. Between 
1560 and 1624, in London, the number of expulsions increased, partially 
resolving the overcrowding of the city though not  the problem of 
wandering on a national scale. In 1667, only one out of ten poor people 
assisted in Naples originated from the city, and the provinces were asked 
for a financial contribution. In 16
th century England the wanderer aroused a 
strong social alarm and was often associated with epidemics or seen as a 
spy and a “papist”. He was therefore granted  a “begging license” and 
obliged to become stable [Berengo, 1999:596-602].  11
2.3.5.  Shameful jobs (mercimonia inhonesta). Starting from the 11th century, 
some humble though useful  jobs, gave rise to categories of  marginal   
workers. They were connected with three medieval taboos : a) blood 
(butchers, quarterers, executioners, but also soldiers ); b) money 
(merchants, money lenders, all accused of usury); c) dirt, as the exterior 
manifestation of inner impurity (cooks, dyers, lavatory-drainers, fullers, 
cloth whiteners). In addition, textile workers were in the odor of heresy. 
Disapproval and mistrust – associated with the money taboo (“devil’s 
dung”) – were directed to those who sold personal attributes on the market. 
The whore, in conflict with the sexuophobic Christian morality, sold her 
body, but the same did professionals and intellectuals, selling their 
intelligence and culture as services. As the social utility principle prevailed 
over moral prejudices, many of these status gained social credit. [Schmitt, 
1979:266-267]. 
2.3.6.  University students. In the medieval and modern university city, students 
were a particular group not entitled to  citizenship. German students were 
present especially in  Bologna, Padoa, Perugia, Paris and Orleans [Ennen, 
1975: 227]. Young students were considered “temporary marginals” who 
resided in the university city for 5-8 years; they had an undefined status 
being laymen reclaiming clerical guarantees. They were subdivided on the 
basis of their nationality and their particular, non- conformist lifestyle – 
turbulent and given to erotic and tavern pleasures – forced authorities to 
isolate them in specific “colleges” [Berengo, 1999:525, 631]. 
2.3.7.  Picaroons and soldiers. They were considered  unemployed, when not 
occupied at war, and lived on expedients and appropriations [Schmitt, 
1979:274].The military garrison of modern age European cities, after the 
municipal militia disappearance, was composed by foreigners and   
perceived by local populations like a foreign community [Berengo, 
1979:274] 
2.3.8.  Gypsies. Gypsies, or “Egyptians”, actually came from the Peloponnese or 
“Little Egypt” and from Rhineland. They arrived in Western Europe in the 
15th century, stirring up curiosity and interest in the exotic but they 
couldn’t enter  cities, and civic authorities gave them some money to go 
away. By the 16
th century they were equated to beggars and wanderers. A 
1682 injunction commanded able-bodied men to be put in jail, women to 
be shaved and expelled, children to be closed in hospitals [Schmitt, 1979: 
274-275]. 
2.3.9.  Beguines and Beghards. They practiced, starting from 12
th century,   
“contemplative asceticism” and lived a voluntary life of poverty.  They can 
be seen as “intermediate” marginals, the expression of an uncertain border 
between laymen and clerics, half-placed between official society and 
marginality [Pirenne, 1971:155; Schmitt, 1979:274]. They were  religious 
men who lived as laymen and were not subject to a rule. They didn’t take 
religious vows, neither did they join a rule officially approved by the 
Church, although they began to appear on the wave of mendicant orders. 
They were rooted in the 13
th century female religious movement; in the 
previous century there had been a number of women who wanted to enter  12
convent without finding a place. First considered heretics, they later 
expanded  their presence at the beginning of 13
th century [Ennen, 
1975:224] Suspected again of heresy in the 14
th and 15th centuries; 
beguines and beghards were considered idle “not useful to God neither to 
the world”. In the first decades of he 15th century this phenomenon 
declined and in the early 16
th century virtually disappeared. [Schmitt, 
1979:274].  
. 
2.4. Excluded people and minorities 
2.4.1.  Islam and Christianity. Policy towards modern European cities 
minorities experienced two opposite exceptions with regard to the norm. The first was 
the Spanish policy towards the Islamic minority slowly expelled by the Reconquista and 
replaced by a Christian resettlement. Temporary mudejares (Arabs remaining in Castilla 
and Aragona kingdoms) were marginalized within cities suburbia. In Murcia and Lorca 
they carried out lower activities, refused by Christian immigrants. Then they were 
expelled from Spain as  moriscos (1492). Quite different was the transition of one large 
European  city, Constantinople, from  Christianity to Islamic capital city, Istanbul. Here 
the social structure was remodelled in the respect of diversity and tolerance, not of 
assimilation and religious conversion. [Berengo, 1999:522, 527-528]. 
2.4.2. Jews. 
Jews were the minority by excellence in medieval and modern European 
cities, differently and variably treated by central and urban governments 
and characterized by high geographical mobility, both spontaneous and 
forced [Berengo, 1999:524]. Until the 1096-1270 Crusades, the social 
position of Jews in European cities was substantially good. In German 
cities their communities enjoyed freedom of movement, settled on royal 
revenues  lands, and the authorities protected them and granted them 
customs facilitations and free-tax trade opportunities. This shows that the 
central authorities were interested in using this economically active 
minority as a lever for the market, trade, monetary and credit economy 
development. Jews were not allowed to buy Christian slaves, but it was not 
necessary for them to buy baptized slaves. They could buy urban and 
country lands and have them tilled by Christian waged labourers. They 
paid a “Jew-tax”, a sort of “gratuity” which became a remarkable source of 
income for local and central public revenues [Ennen, 1979:220-221]. Thus 
Jews were not persecuted until the 13
th Century, although they were 
juridically excluded for they did not belong to the Christian community. 
They spoke everyone’s language, didn’t have to wear identification 
symbols and worked in many fields such as agriculture, handicraft, trade 
and medicine, sometimes holding public positions. It was the Crusades that 
transformed the Christian communities’ attitude towards the Jews into 
mistrust, social exclusion and, finally, persecutions and massacres. They 
were groundlessly charged with ritual murder, consecrated host profanation 
and, well before 1348, with poisoning, for they were notoriously expert in 
medicine[Schmitt, 1979:268-269; Berengo, 1999:544]. A progressive 
withdrawal of the Jewish presence following expulsions (England, 1290 – 
definitive; France, 1306 and – definitive – 1394; Castilla and Aragona,  13
1492; Portugal, 1496; Kingdom of Naples, 1510 and 1541) took place in 
the European cities. Christians and Jews lived together only in the Po area, 
in central Italy and in the Empire [Berengo, 1999:531]. The religious 
nature of the persecutions against the Jews is demonstrated by the fact that 
the 14
th century economic crisis had a strong impact on the condition of the 
Jews who were excluded from the guilds and pushed towards financial 
activities (loans upon pledge) which caused them to be hated by the 
population. By the middle of the 14
th century – after the 1348 plague – 
persecutions grew with expulsions from cities, and continued throughout 
the 14
th and 15
th centuries [Ennen, 1975:221-222]. In 14
th century France, 
there was a continuous swinging between expulsions – when Jewish 
contributing capacity was lowest – and recalls,  tolerance, persecutions and 
massacres [Schmitt, 1979:270]. In all German cities – with the exception 
of Frankfurt –the destruction of Jewish historical memory was completed 
in the 16
th century, with the destruction of the Jewish graveyards and 
synagogues turned into churches. More open was the situation in Austria 
and Bohemia. A ruralization of Jewish communities took place in the 16
th 
and 17
th century Elban-sided Germany; the Jews returned to the cities of 
that area after the Thirty Years War and, with more intensity, during the 
18
th century [Berengo, 1999:532-533], It was observed that “among all the 
minorities who lived between urban walls, this one was […] the most 
discriminated; but, at the same time, the one that the Christian world tried 
hard to assimilate and absorb” [Berengo, 1999:550]. 
 
2.5. A "geography" of social diversity and marginality 
2.5.1.  Continental marginality. In relation to a civilizing centre, from time to 
time great diversities and marginalities are defined on a continental or 
intercontinental scale: barbarians (non-romanized), heathens (early-Middle 
Ages Scandinavians and Hungarians), schismatics (Byzantines), infidels 
(Muslims). Some deviants (missionaries), pushed by a civilizing and 
evangelizing impulse, moved towards this new world [Schmitt, 1979:264-
265]. 
2.5.2.  Micro-marginality. At a micro-territorial level, beyond the urbanized and 
colonized agrarian area, a wild world stretched (forest, men from the forest; 
desert), where the  marginals of medieval Christianity lived: charcoal-
burners; miners; anchorets. Where the forest gave way to the moor, there 
were shepherds, isolated beast-companions, depositories of an arcane 
knowledge, pushed by loneliness towards abnormal behaviours, both of a 
religious (spreading of Catharist heresy) and sexual kind (Sardinian 
shepherds “bestial” loves) [Schmitt, 1979, 264-265]. 
. 
2.6. Recognizing diversity 
Social diversity – marginality chiefly – was often accompanied by visibility through 
exterior signs of a voluntary or imposed nature. Marginality might unconsciously 
appear from a physical alteration: the fullers and dyers’ “blue nails”, typical of vile 
professions; or from dressing-imposed exterior signs. In the medieval city, the 
belonging to a specific social order was marked by a specific dressing style, often  14
prescribed by municipal councils as sumptuary laws [Ennen, 1975:216]. When a 
rapidly changing fashion asserted itself, the recycling of out-of-fashion clothing, 
abandoned as garbage by the ruling class, made the lower social orders  wear the old 
clothes of the upper orders [Sori, 1999:41]. In 17
th century Great Britain, the 
dressing style in conformity with the belonging order fell legally into disuse, but 
people continued to give importance to it and resentment towards plebs wearing 
clothes reserved to upper social strata  spread [Laslett, 1979:50]. Besides being a 
distinctive trait, clothing might be a symbol of common destinies. In 14
th and 15
th 
centuries medieval cities, the early forms of “class” solidarity between discriminated 
boys were underlined also by several dressing elements [Ennen, 1975:217]. 
Members of the “Saccati” mendicant order were called in that manner because of 
their sackcloths [Le Goff, 1979:25]. 
However it was pre-industrial society which showed great imagination in 
elaborating exterior signs of discrimination and shame. In the 13
th century, 
obligation to be recognized appeared with respect to Jews. In 1215 the Lateran 
Council transformed the Muslim principle consisting of an obligation for non-
muslim to wear an exterior distinctive sign (a girdle, or something else), into another 
kind of obligation, that of wearing a “rotula”, diverse in shape and colour according 
to a specific country [Berengo 1999:549]. In 1269 Saint Louis prescribed a red-
fabric ring sewn on the sleeves, and Philippe le Beauu, in 1285, forced Jews to buy 
it, as a taxable matter. Some 14
th French repentant heretics were forced to sew upon 
their clothes two yellow crosses – one on the chest and another on the back. Lepers 
might get out of their lepers colonies under the condition to be well recognizable, 
with white-fabric hood and collar, knapsack and harness-bells [Schmitt, 1979:269-
270; Le Goff, 1979:25]. The medieval madman, moving round freely, was 
recognizable thanks to his shaved skull, the “labelled” poor had to wear a badge, 
while tramps and criminals were marked on their flesh with two letters, “V” and 
“GAL”, as a brand of infamy [Schmitt, 1979, 286]. Whores had to wear particular 
clothes when they went about in the streets and  a distinctive sign and – sometimes 
they had to carry a little bell too [Berengo, 1999:643]. 
 
2.7. Trends 
The response to the growth of pauperism, marginality and deviance in the 16
th century  
was  segregation, since expulsion, at its new decisional level – the national one related 
to the new modern and widely territorial-based State – did not make sense anymore. 
Already in the 16
th century experiments were made to segregate the jobless in public 
ateliers and bureaux des pauvres but the real change occurred in the middle of the 17
th 
century  with the internment of poor and madmen in France (Hôpital Général), 
Germany (Zuchthaüser) and England (Workhouses). The Hôpital Général was founded 
in Paris in 1656 and in a few weeks 5-6,000 persons were locked up in it. The Hôpital 
was a prison-hospital where tramps, beggars, crippled and madmen lived together 
without any form of assistance. This model was to be extended to some French 




3.  URBAN MILIEU AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
3.1. Urbanization and social differentiation 
3.1.1.  The city of urban revolution as a marginal society. The revolutionary 
nature or medieval urbanization and its role as an agent of social 
differentiation was underlined by M. Weber and H. Pirenne. According to 
Weber, the originality of the western European medieval city – compared to 
the city outside Europe  (the Asian one) – rested on its functional base and 
on the social actors living in it. Economic extra-agricultural activity, 
merchants and craftsmen were its core, consequently developing  rationality 
as a distinctive trait of modern man and individualism. This could happen 
thanks to  growing freedom from primary (family, cliques) and secondary 
(religious associations, orders, etc.) social institutions. In determining 
social status, individual relations of a contractual nature tended to prevail 
over the hereditary (genetic and patrimonial) principle; and so did the 
private interest over ethical and religious traditional norms. Pirenne focused 
on the so called footloose adventurers, persons not completely included in 
the feudal society who founded their economic role upon long-distance 
trade deciding to take their abode in a place near the feudal settlement 
(episcopal city, the earl’s castle) [Herlihy, 1976:174-175; Tabacco, 
1987:327-345]. The city, in conclusion, can be seen as a society marginal to 
the feud, in which marginal subjects (footloose adventurers, servants, 
foreigners and fugitives) became the protagonists of its birth and 
affirmation between the 11
th and the 12
th centuries [Schmitt, 1979:266]. 
3.1.2.  The urbanization of feudal élites. In contrast with Pirenne’s 
generalizations, successive storiography pointed out both exaggerations 
about an alleged economic passivity of the civitates and pre-urban centres  
and a geographical articulation – inside Europe – of social differentiation 
and urbanization processes. Merchants, in Italy, were not  all footloose 
adventurers or outsiders, but they often came  from within the feudal 
society, such as rural land owners, lords of a castle or sometimes also 
knights and feudal noblemen. Rhineland, Flanders or England were 
different models, for the local élites didn’t become urbanized and cities 
arose under imperial and royal patronage. The political and social Italian 
urbanization model was reflected in the features of the medieval city  and 
its evolution (see beyond). As for Pirenne’s and Weber’s assumptions, the 
separation between the city and the countryside seems to be definitely 
exaggerated. [Herlihy, 1976:177; Fasoli, 1973:62]. 
3.1.3.  The social structure and institutions of the medieval state-town and the 
modern age city. In the urban revolution state-town, limitations to 
individual liberties were overcome by civic sense and cooperation and 
social interdependence: accepting offices to which one was appointed; 
doing military service; associational activity; work ethics. Rights and duties 
were proportionate to economic means, but the have-nots too felt part of 
the community, although they did not participate in political life. The 
following scheme shows the internal organization of the Italian state town 
as well as the relationship between its social and institutional structure:  16
• The municipality: it was the “horizontal” government system with a 
corporative representation; 
• The quarter: it was an urbanistic division; 
• The neighborhood; it was the smallest of the territorial districts into 
which the quarter was subdivided. It coincided with the parish. It had an 
assembly and elective chiefs, gave infantrymen and knights to the army 
and guards to the city. Chiefs controlled, among other things, sumptuary 
sums, expelled lepers and whores and denounced heretics, gamblers, 
irregulars, swearers and nocturnal thieves, playing an important role in the 
social control system. 
• The guilds; they reproduced the communal structure with the members’ 
general assembly, the council, officials elected with a mixed system (by lot 
and by vote); all the members could aspire to hold an office. They issued 
work norms, organized religious practices and gave assistance to members. 
• The armed associations; they were joined by those who didn’t belong to  
the guilds, of which they reproduced both the structure and the functions. 
• The confraternities; for supplementary religious practices. 
•  The pleasure-loving brigades 
• Foreigners’associations,“nations”and “consulates” of merchants and 
students, or confraternities of far-coming immigrants. 
 
Within this kind of urban society everything was choral manifestation, 
community sense elevation, enhanced by a thick calendar of civil and 
religious feasts ; everyone felt to be part of a collective body [Fasoli, 1973: 
67-68]. In such a complex institutional context, legal citizenship was an 
essential socio- economic element . It was not accidentally that it was used 
as an incentive (to be granted in a short time and without formalities) or as 
a  sanction (refusal with loss of relative rights, banishment or expulsion). 
Municipalities used citizenship as an incentive, along with other 
concessions, to induce craftsmen to move from far away and settle in a 
given town, improving its productive structure and competitiveness 
[Cipolla, 1997:93-94]. Also the territorial authorities of the west coast   
Adriatic cities  made use of citizenship when, between the end of 14
th 
century and the beginning of the 15
th century, attracted Slavonians and 
Albanians from the east coast to repopulate the countryside and the towns 
depopulated by the plague. Citizenship, along with the framing of the 
immigrated “colonies” in particular ethnic-based confraternities, enabled 
these last to achieve a relatively rapid social integration and professional 
rise [Anselmi, 1988:11-25; 57:81]. 
The presence of foreign mercantile colonies, grouped as “nations”, was 
more institutionalised. These could obtain juridical warranties and 
privileges from territorial governments. The distinctive feature defining the 
fullness of a nation’s rights is the presence of a consulate, an elective legal 
body representing the associated merchants, both in the town of residence  
and in their country of origin. It was a special jurisdiction,  sometimes 
reduced to arbitration appealing to ordinary justice. To be – fully or 
partially – a citizen meant the removal of many constraints and controls to  17
which a foreigner – merchants in particular – could be subjected, but at the 
same time it meant the possible loss of  privileges enjoyed by a “nation”.  
By the middle of the 16
th century, Antwerp and Venice – this last with 
Slavonians, Albanians, catholic and schismatic Greeks, Turks, Germans 
and so on – were cosmopolitan cities, thanks to their trade supremacy 
[Berengo, 1999:524-525; 557:567]. 
3.1.4.Discriminating between and within urban guilds. In the 14
th century a 
strong dependence of artisan guilds on the mercantile ones developed. This 
situation recalls, on one side, Weberian assumptions about power and the 
market, on the other side, the relevance of the economic cycle – it was 
negative in 1300 – in determining power relationships between social 
groups [Ennen, 1975:213]. Nevertheless, in such a phase the entire 
“horizontal” solidaristic framework started to deteriorate. Central European 
guilds, becoming conservative and “corporative” (closed to new members) 
no longer guaranteed social and professional mobility to apprentices who 
strived to gather as a league and, in any case, increased their spatial 
mobility. Boys’associations were strongly opposed by masters’associations 
and cohabitation between them became rare. Agreements between 
craftsmen of different German towns were made so that a boy driven away 
by one craftsman might not be accepted by another craftsman of a different 
town. In addition, legal obstacles to boys’ marriage arose [Ennen, 
1975:217]. 
3.1.5.   Colonization and ethnic aspects of rural-urban relation. In the towns 
colonized by the Germans (Drang nach Osten) with a Slavonic-Baltic 
background, or in those of the eastern Adriatic coast, under Italian-
Venetian hegemony and again a Slavonic background, the social 
differentiation process didn’t need  juridical protection or conflicts to 
affirm and maintain itself. It existed and operated de facto, with the 
linguistic diversity and the ethnic variety of rural-urban relationship, which 
became a Slavic-German or an Italian-Slavic relationship. Those urban 
minorities were divided by census and ethnicity, but they were united  by a 
common religious faith [Berengo, 1999:523]. 
3.1.6.  The city of the industrial revolution. According to J. Foster, the 
urbanization which accompanied the industrial revolution and its 
developments had no uniform outcomes in terms of social differentiation 
and cultural forms of collective (class) identity and solidarity. The analysis 
of three middle-sized British towns in the 19
th century shows that, although 
participating in the same capitalistic reality, they developed quite different 
social structures. One case shows  strong class consciousness and 
homogeneity, another  shows extreme social fragmentation. The last case 
shows an intermediate position between the first two. The differences are 
explained by the author with two main factors:  on the one hand, the urban 
elitist structure was something very different from the industrial middle 
class. On the other, the labour market for an industrial “single crop” system 
(a big coal and steel plant, for instance) produces one compact working 
class subculture [Foster, 1974:178-196]. 
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3.2. Urban social diversity and marginality.  
3.2.1.  Medieval urbanization social ecology.  
H. Pirenne was the first to speak of social ecology in relation to the urban 
structure and growth models observed during the urban revolution in medieval 
Europe. The new social and economic actors took up their abode, opened their 
shops and warehouses outside the early Middle Age pre-urban centre wall. This 
settlement gave rise, under various appellations, (burgus, portus, suburbium, 
colonia, emporium) to the typical  urbanistic bipolarity between civitas/castle 
and burgus, united then by the first communal walled belt built by burgenses 
commune promoters. Therefore the Burgus, that is the commercial settlement, 
was the propelling centre of institutional, social and economic innovation. As for 
Italy (Tuscany, in particular) the original urbanization model produced three 
distinctive  urbanistic and socio-political structures, perfectly coinciding with 
each other. 
•  Τhe patrician city,( 11
th and 12
th centuries), the towered city formed by an 
aggregate of fortified noble buildings, where large clans resided importing from 
the city some forms of rural society. They had exterior identification marks like 
flags and insignia. 
•  Τhe plebeian city,(13
th century and early 14
th century),  was the communal 
city in the fullness of its economic, social and political characteristics Perfectly 
correspondent to the new arrangement was the city-planning, with straight, wide 
and free arteries, wide squares for markets and preaching, large churches and 
huge public buildings and popular quarters 
•  Τhe high class city,( late 14
th century and 15
th century), was the smaller city 
after the demographic crisis of the mid-13th century, where the growing 
concentration of wealth and the clear signs of the aristocratization of the great 
families had specific consequences upon the town planning (fewer buildings, 
large palaces, urban renewal and public areas arrangement) [Herlihy, 1976:176-
185; Fasoli, 1973:65]. 
3.2.2.   Near and outside the city walls. Topographic position within the urban 
tissue and the social position in the social pyramid were interdependent. 
The miller was in a sense a marginal. He lived in the mill, at the edge of the 
town, operating an impressive “machine” at the time , anomalous but 
necessary. Sometimes he aroused some heresy suspicions (Menocchio, in 
C. Ginzurg’s Il formaggio e i vermi), [Schmitt, 1979:265]. The executioner 
too was subject to some sort of  marginalization – both social and spatial. 
The executioner’s function was often imposed upon social groups regarded 
as inferior. Byzantines imposed it upon Jews in Candia, Turks upon 
gypsies, the town of Recanati (Italy) upon Slavonians, and Ascoli Piceno 
(another Italian town) upon foreigners. The executioner couldn’t be buried 
in  consecrated soil, nor could he receive the Holy Communion and when 
attending mass he had to stand at the end of the church. His job, 
discontinuous by nature, could be integrated with some other shameful jobs 
such as lavatory-drainer, stray dogs snatcher, wheat-market cleaner, whore 
controller, animals skinner, surgeon. His residence could be inside a 
brothel, in Munich, but more usually his home was outside the walled belt  19
[Berengo, 1999:635-638]. Monastic hospitals, pilgrim-houses and leper 
colonies were usually placed outside the walls and, in the 12
th and 13
th 
centuries, there was an increase in the number of lazarettos with confined 
lepers near cross-roads and at the edge of the city lands [Berengo, 
1999:615; Schmitt, 1979:271]. As for brothels it was often  proposed to 
locate it outside the city along with the whores (Saint Luis, 1254), but city 
authorities were more cautious and ordered them to be outside the walled 
belt or in the immediate environs. Between the late 13
th century and  1325 
in Florence, it was ordered that the brothel should be no less than 1,000 
braccios (half a kilometer)  from the walls. These were warnings of a 
bigger, more complex problem concerning the location of such “necessary” 
places  to which the society of the time was applying the “not in my yard” 
principle [Berengo, 1999:638]. 
3.2.3.  Ghettos. They were born in consequence of the concentration of the 
Jews, who were first grouped in the same quarter and later segregated. The 
ghetto was the juridical ratification of the spontaneous aggregation realized 
by ethnic and religious groups to satisfy their needs (communal services, 
relationship facilitations, identity preservation). Berengo notes that “Where 
a jewish community was formed, a list of places, buildings and structures 
had to be available: a synagogue, first, and then a school; the ritual bath; a 
butchery; an oven and, far from the built-up area, a cemetery […]For   
worshipping the ten adult males requested by the Mosaic law weren’t 
sufficient, in practice,several services were necessary which  generated by 
necessity a separate and distinct entity within the urban context”. The same 
happened with Arab mudejares [Berengo, 1999:553]. The origins of the 
jewish ghetto are remote. In 1084, some jews from Meinz who emigrated to 
Spira were placed in a sort of ghetto, although they were granted some 
privileges [Ennen, 1975:220]. A Call Judaico, with a main door to be 
locked from the inside for the protection (and on the initiative ) of the Jews 
themselves, was constituted in Gerona (Spain) in 1176. In the late 13
th 
century until 1330 in Portugal a wide judarias network spread; between 
1390 and 1391  with anti-Jew risings in both countries, John I ordered the 
Jews to re-enter their quarters and remain locked in after the Hail Mary, 
such a measure being almost necessary for their protection. Before the 
expulsion Palermo had the greatest concentration of Jews  in Europe, with a 
ghetto extending for about 10 hectares. Between the 12
th and the 15
th 
centuries, France preferred to indicate the streets in which Jews should live 
although without any obligation for them to reenter their quarter and lock 
main doors and gates . In Italy too the open giudecche were transformed 
into closed ghettoes, and the same happened  within the Papal State, 
between 1556 and 1634, with the forced concentration of all the Jews 
belonging to the state (with the exception of Ferrara, Pesaro, Urbino and 
Senigallia) in two ghettos, one in Rome and one in Ancona [Berengo, 
1999:537-540]. 
3.2.4.   “Miracles courts”. It’s a 17
th century originating reality, by which is 
meant a whole of urban streets and courtyards in which social marginality 
(criminality, prostitution and beggary) concentrates permanently. It’s still  20
doubtful whether it was the bad environmental quality to attract marginals 
or whether it was the marginals to provoke environmental decay. The 
scattering area of this kind of marginality was greater than that of ghettos 
and  beguinages. The attractive elements of this social underworld were 
taverns (often associated with a brothel) or prisons (the Paris Châtelet) 
considered as  crime schools. In Paris, the court des miracles enjoyed in 
time unusual topographic stability between the 14
th and 18
th centuries 
[Schmitt, 1979:278-279]. City authorities – pushed by the remonstrance of 
both lay and religious people – decided to confine “lovely women’s 
houses” or “young women’s courts” (euphemisms ruled in this field) to 
streets or groups of streets from which they couldn’t be shifted. It was not 
unusual  that the marginalization of the whore was added to that of the 
foreigner’s status. At the beginning whores came from afar, from Germany, 
in particular, from the areas ravaged by the 100 Years War, and from 
Slavony; then the recruitment area became regional but – in German cities  
whores and procurers were forbidden to practice in their city of origin 
[Berengo, 1999:638-644] 
3.2.5.   Beguinages and Fuggerei. In the 14
th century free beguinage tended to 
disappear, and in the 15
th century only the conventual one resisted, linked 
to a traditional monastic order rule. Evidently the demand for the social 
control of this phenomenon increased as shown by the centralized structure 
physically separate from the city housing . Two models are traceable: the 
collective dwelling-place (West Germany, Northern France, Wallon) and 
the quarter made of little houses bordering on each other, grouped around a 
church and placed under the spiritual control of a priest (Low Countries, 
the south, in particular). In that period it was not unusual for productive 
work to come alongside devotions [Ennen, 1975:225]. In Strasbourg, in the 
late Middle Ages, beguines’ houses grouped around mendicant order 
convents [Schmitt, 1979:278]. 
 
3.3. Urbanization, social integration, economic development in the contemporary 
age: two case-studies.  
3.3.1.  Urbanization and inventiveness. A cross-section analysis of USA  and 
Connecticut cities at the end of 19
th  and the beginning of 20
th centuries 
confirms the hypothesis of  a close relationship between urbanization and 
inventiveness, quantitatively measured by the number of registered patents. 
If we accept an historical transposition of this relationship (cross section = 
time series),  we have an explanation of United States economic growth as 
a self-sustained process before the institutionalization of R&D activities. In 
a phase of non-remarkable comparative advantages in  international trade, 
and of sectorial productivity increase, economic growth gives way to 
urbanization, in turn explained by  Engel’s law and by changes of relative 
profitability between agriculture and extra-agricultural activities. If 
urbanization encourages greater inventiveness, however, a positive 
feedback effect occurs on development, through faster technological 
progress. This happened within the technical conditions of that time, 
assigning to technology the primacy of inventiveness [Higgs, 1975:259].  21
3.3.2.  Urbanization and slavery. U.S. historians debated about counterfactual 
hypothesis that, once the South became urbanized, slavery would disappear 
because slavery and urbanization were incompatible.The empirical analysis 
shows that, at least for the 1820-1860 period, urban slavery was a solid 
institution flexible enough to be consistent with urban growth. The 
hypothesis that urban demand for slaves was decreasing around 1860 was 
proved to be wrong, for the 1850s fall was due to conjunctural economic 
factors like the slaves price growth and not to a decline of the slavery 
institution [Dale Goldin, 1975:246]. 
 
4. HISTORIOGRAPHIC  ASSUMPTIONS 
 
For what concerns marginality, nowadays the idea prevails that “a society shows itself 
thouroughly through its behaviour towards its marginals”. Three were the policies 
toward diversity: integration (e.g. merchant), exclusion (e.g. madmen), swing from 
tolerance to exclusion (Jews). The urban revolution city integrated activities once 
marginalized by the feudal Middle Ages, through the ideology of labour and labour 
remuneration, giving an official and prominent position to intellectuals, merchants, 
craftsmen and whores too. These last were “stabilized” and recognized as a public 
service useful to fight sodomy, limit sexual crimes (most of all among young people), 
pay fees to municipality and secure public order. “Usurers” were more difficult to 
integrate: one had to make recourse to expedients to hide the lending activity at an  
interest (bill of exchange) or to the devolution to the Jews of the small loan activity for 
consumption [Schmitt, 1979:268,277; Berengo, 1999:641]. 
Long period trends between 11th and 18th century were: 
•  Integration (11
th-13th)  Exclusion  Internment 
•  Proliferation and diversification of marginality forms. 
The economic trend was a  factor which greatly influenced the social integration 
capacity of the European pre-industrial town. Its 14
th century reversal brought about 
strong measures by the municipalities against rural handicraft, and social tensions 
caused by the emergence of an urban proletariat consisting of disbanded handicraft-
masters and workers with no more hopes to become autonomous, strong patrimonial 
polarization and economic policy sclerotomy. The negative end-of-Middle Age 
conjuncture brought about diversification between major cities, overcoming the crisis 
through specialisation in luxury handicraft products (Antwerp), and smaller cities, 
where the crisis increased and pauperism was nurtured by impoverished craftsmen and 
rural disqualified immigrants. The clergy too was subject to a social and economic 
diversification process. The number of secular clerics rose, not dedicated to souls 
(chaplains, officiants, lower clerics) often with very modest revenues. Not very edifying 
information regarding this social group is available, especially about poor clerics 
(wandering clerics)’education and moral conduct [Ennen, 1975:213,219,223-224]. 
Generally speaking B. Geremek places the multiplication of marginal West European 
social groups at the end of the Middle Ages together with the feudalism crisis, hitting at 
the same time the rural economy, the urban labour market and the evangelical ideal of 
voluntary poverty. These were the early signals of an originary capital accumulation 
which needed, in a rarefied manpower period, the reduction of wages. [Schmitt, 
1979:286; Geremek, 1992:3-18; Id., 1986:3-67; Id., 1988:VII-XXXIII].  22
Trends were governed by a social utilitarian principle, which defined the edge beyond 
which the safety of goods, people and social order was threatened. Utility favored the 
integration of markets and craftsmen, usurers and weavers, rejecting idle people beyond 
the edge. Knowledge was another remarkable boundary, beyond which  individuals, like 
Gypsies, eluded any social taxonomy and lacked any status. These were nomads with 
dark-coloured skin who, to be accepted, defined themselves as pilgrims on the way to 
Rome, being nevertheless rejected by a deep-rooted sedentary conscience. The Edge 
moved along history. In the Middle Ages it crossed  the centre of  society, proceeding 
for example through social groups like beguines and beghards. The very edge between 
God and the devil was not clear. The wealth stored up by merchants, reprovable in itself, 
could be turned to a good purpose, if one died repenting and leaving all his richness to 
the church and charitable institutions. Lepers, though revolting, were living charity 
instruments. The Jews were Old Testament heirs, although they were  Christ’s 
murderers. The poor lived in conformity with the Gospel, but their very presence 
represented a permanent challenge for the official Church. During the Middle Ages the 
Christian ideology was open and, thorough a more general salvation project, strived to 
“redeem” the marginal ones. Only in the modern age was marginality  really rejected to 
the periphery of the society, while the gray uncertain zones disappeared. Medieval 
society built up itself through successive integrations; the modern, royal  state society 
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